It acknowledged the deep failures in the agency's prewar assessments of Iraq's weapons programs but said "the analysis was right" on cultural and political issues related to postwar Iraq.

In these and other cases, the prewar assessments about Iraq's illicit weapons were based on reports from intelligence sources who did not have firsthand information about what they described.

The commission examined the performance of 15 of the country's intelligence agencies and their prewar assessment of unconventional weapons in Iraq.

Fifty-nine percent now say the United States was accurate in its prewar assessment, compared to 31 percent who said it underestimated the fight the Iraqis would put up.

While Israel's prewar assessment of Iraq appeared to be generally in line with the United States', Mr. Steinitz cited at least one difference.

He is most remembered for his ill-conceived prewar assessment that Egypt and Syria would not attack, despite intelligence to the contrary (also known as "The Concept").

Mr. Tenet and his agency have insisted that it is too soon to say whether the C.I.A. made mistakes in its prewar assessment.

The House Intelligence Committee has already requested that the C.I.A. investigate whether prewar assessments of Iraq's weapons capacity were flawed.

A report last summer by the Senate committee concluded that the certainty of prewar assessments on Iraq had not been supported by the intelligence available at the time.

Initially valued at $78 million, based on low prewar assessments, the claims today, as a result of 6 percent annual compound interest, have mushroomed to $370 million.