phenomenality

The phenomenality would entail convergence, if the computational function does.

I do not find this sufficient to establish a necessary connection between reflexivity and phenomenality.

For as Lyvers rightly emphasises, there can be no direct behavioural test of animal phenomenality.

I still think that reflexivity is inessential to phenomenality.

As I said at the outset, the relationship between intentionality and phenomenality is an extremely pressing issue in the philosophy of mind.

PI is the source of the concern that I separate phenomenality and intentionality too little.

But the worry is that I may separate phenomenality from intentionality in some ways too little and in others too much.

Ludwig also claims to find a necessary link between reflexivity and phenomenality by arguing roughly as follows.

Hence the phenomenality of perceptual experience is inseparable from a kind of reflexivity.

Henry counterposed this conception of phenomenality with a radical phenomenology of life.

However (as I acknowledge on page 202), this leaves standing the suggestion that some associated higher-order dispositional belief is essential to phenomenality.

Nirvana is like phenomenality, unarisen and unstopping.

Another form of anti-intentionalism associated with John Searle regards phenomenality itself as the "mark of the mental" and sidelines intentionality.

Conceptually, the "vertical world axis", understood previously as the un-fatiguable, eternal master of mortality, gave way to "Time, the emptiness of all phenomenality".

Marion argues that while the Principle of all Principles places givenness as phenomenality's criterion and achievement, givenness still remains uninterrogated.

Ludwig first finds some indication that reflexivity is built into phenomenality in my "seems" talk-the locutions I employ to identify phenomenal features as "ways of seeming."

Equally importantly, this narrow understanding of intentionality hampers arguments to show that phenomenality is inextricably linked with intentionality, particularly in the case of imagination (273).

This is why, thus manifested, we are not as such (phenomenally), and why we are as phenomenal noumenality (or noumenal phenomenality).

I emphatically agree with Siewert that phenomenality should not be discounted as a bit of detritus, brute or unimportant in itself or irrelevant to our deeper cognitive life.

But maybe we should see reflexivity in all sensory phenomenality for the reason Ludwig goes on to suggest-that the latter is closely bound up with the perspectival nature of perception.

I disagree with him on this, but I admit that in my book I do not address the specific reasons he offers for holding that reflexivity is essential to phenomenality.

I argue for this conception partly by arguing that the sorts of reasons that may lead one to think that noetic phenomenality could not guarantee non-iconic thought do not withstand examination.

The emphasis is on what is being done, thought, and felt at the present moment (the phenomenality of both client and therapist), rather than on what was, might be, could be, or should have been.

First, I am doubtful of the suggestion that if I rejected RI, and held that phenomenality entails reflexivity, I would be sitting pretty with respect to accounting for first-person knowledge and warrant.

Or maybe phenomenality requires them to enjoy a mental reflexivity not of a "conceptual" sort at all, properly speaking, but "non-conceptual" in character (in something like the way sensory representations of particular places are non-conceptual).