phenomenalism

By the 20th century, views similar to Berkeley's were called phenomenalism.

The question of what psychological needs are met by phenomenalism would help to make the subject come alive.

But such a phenomenalism is only one form of reductionism.

And with this admission, phenomenalism loses one of its advantages.

The Sautrāntika school held a form of phenomenalism that saw the world as imperceptible.

Phenomenalism narrows the gap between the world we experience and our experience of it.

A further focus of Stegmüller's work was phenomenalism.

Mach defended a type of phenomenalism recognizing only sensations as real.

Chisholm (1948) criticises phenomenalism as a theory of meaning.

However, phenomenalism is based on mental operations.

Phenomenalism is the theory that representations (or sense data) of external objects are all that exist.

This is the metaphysical advantage of phenomenalism.

He argues for a sophisticated sense-datum account, although he rejects phenomenalism.

I have expressed phenomenalism so far as if all phenomenalists agree that observation statements report the nature of the reporter's own sensory states.

Irrealism was initially motivated by the debate between phenomenalism and physicalism in epistemology.

He made a courageous break from subjectivism, which was the pervasive philosophical paradigm of the times, and also criticized phenomenalism.

Yogācāra has also been aligned with phenomenalism.

This view has similarities with phenomenalism.

John Stuart Mill had a theory of perception which is commonly referred to as classical phenomenalism.

Roderick Chisholm criticized the logical positivist version of phenomenalism in 1948.

So, by 'reductio ad absurdum', we must reject any theory that would force us to accept either skepticism or phenomenalism.

Realist conceptions include phenomenalism and direct and indirect realism.

Kant's "epistemological phenomenalism", as it has been called, is therefore quite distinct from Berkeley's earlier ontological version.

Idealist, phenomenalism, or mentalistic monism which holds that only mind or spirit is real.

He uses this notion to re-interpret phenomenalism, claiming that it need not take the form of a reductionism (often considered untenable).