The nationalist commander divided the city into two sectors along the Huangpu River.

It was obvious the nationalist commanders were not able to effectively direct the combat operations under such conditions.

The personality of the local nationalist commanders was also a contributor to the nationalist defeat.

After the first reports of the massacre, Croatian nationalist commanders denied that anything unusual had happened at Stupni Do.

Chiang and nationalist overall commander in Manchuria, General Wei Lihuang agreed their proposal.

However, the nationalist commanders of the second echelon were reluctant and more importantly, impossible to devote their force 100%, and instead, only send small detachments.

The nationalist commander was confident on the defense of the city and he postulated that the communist enemy would not succeed in breaching the defense.

After learning the nationalist commander refused to surrender, the communists organized several assault teams to charge the nationalist commander's hideout.

During the Cultural Revolution he came under attack by the Red Guards for being a former nationalist commander and died of a heart attack in 1968.

These revolts would be put down by nationalist commanders each time they broke out.