A hybrid instrument of a cap and carbon tax can be made by creating a price-floor and price-ceiling for emission permits.

One way of addressing carbon leakage is to give sectors vulnerable to international competition free emission permits (Carbon Trust, 2009).

Thus environmental groups may purchase and retire emission permits and hence drive up the price of the remaining permits according to the law of demand.

Failure to report emissions and surrender emission permits is often punishable by a further government regulatory mechanism, such as a fine that increases costs of production.

One of these is that emission permits can be freely distributed to polluting industries, rather than the revenues going to the government.

On the other hand, freely distributing emission permits could potentially lead to corrupt behaviour (World Bank, 2010, p. 268).

We must also look at using market-based mechanisms, such as tradeable emission permits.

They can always purchase emission permits.

However, the main pressure should be placed on trade in emission permits and the creation of an appropriate system for enforcing this method.

Other amendments are unacceptable, as they leave it up to the market to regulate by means of emission permits, clean development mechanisms, and so on.