tying contract

These scholars argue that courts should analyze tying contracts under the Rule of Reason.

Scholars from various schools of antitrust policy have been consistently critical of the per se rule against tying contracts.

At the same time, courts condemned as "unlawful exclusion" tying contracts, exclusive dealing, and other agreements that disadvantaged rivals.

Thus, these scholars assumed that firms employed market power to impose tying contracts, but that such contracts were nonetheless harmless or even beneficial.

For instance, some economists have argued that a franchiser may employ tying contracts to ensure that franchisees with little repeat business purchase inputs of sufficient quality.

And it is not a good sign when Dennis Rodman, the league's fearless rebounding king, is worried about tying contract incentives to team performance a week before the season begins.

Moreover, the Court retained the per se rule against tying contracts but raised the threshold showing of market power that plaintiffs must make to satisfy the rule's requirement of "economic power" (see Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1985).

Quintessential examples of interbrand restraints include tying contracts, whereby a purchaser agrees to purchase a second product as a condition of obtaining a so-called "tying" product, and exclusive dealing agreements, whereby a dealer agrees not to purchase products from suppliers that are rivals of the manufacturer.