principal-agent problem
theory of agency

At the heart of corporate law is something that economists call the "principal-agent problem."

Tipping is sometimes given as an example of the principal-agent problem in economics.

As a solution to the principal-agent problem, though, tipping is not perfect.

One reason is what economists call the principal-agent problem.

This is specifically the case for the principal-agent problem.

This is a manifestation of the principal-agent problem known as moral hazard.

Most commonly, information asymmetries are studied in the context of principal-agent problems.

Takeovers may also benefit from principal-agent problems associated with top executive compensation.

The agency paradigm highlights the importance of principal-agent problems.

He has also analyzed how peer pressure and mandatory retirement can help reduce principal-agent problems in companies.

In the classic principal-agent problem, a principal hires an agent to work on his behalf.

Co-operative enterprises address the principal-agent problem by making all users of an enterprise into owners.

As it applies to the operations of firms, it is more accurately called the principal-agent problem.

This is called the principal-agent problem, which is one possible explanation for the existence of involuntary unemployment.

This is a way for firms to solve the principal-agent problem, by attempting to realign employees' interests with those of the firm.

Pension spiking is largely seen in public sector and is an example of the principal-agent problem.

This sector is intrinsically prone to principal-agent problem, moral hazard, and rent seeking.

Before 1987, the canonical treatment of the principal-agent problem focused on the informativeness of performance measures.

More recently, the continuing Great Recession brought the principal-agent problem again to the center of debate, in particular regarding corporate governance.

When the owner(s) appoint agents to manage the organisation, conflicts of interest arise which are studied as the principal-agent problem.

He and Krishnamurthy introduce principal-agent problem to a model to show how specialists' capital investments are pro-cyclical.

Market failures are often associated with information asymmetries, non-competitive markets, principal-agent problems, externalities, or public goods.

Supply-side failures largely result from principal-agent problem.

The fundamental need for financial accounting is to reduce principal-agent problem by measuring and monitoring agents' performance and reporting the results to interested users.

"The "principal-agent problem", as it is known in economics, crops up any time agents aren't inclined to do what principals want them to do.