rational ignorance

This is related to the concept of rational ignorance.

Rent seeking and rational ignorance are two of the mechanisms which allow this to happen.

One studied problem is that each voter has little influence and may therefore have a rational ignorance regarding political issues.

It resulted in water pollution due to rational ignorance.

An individual voter may have a rational ignorance regarding politics, especially in nationwide elections, since each vote has little weight.

Rational ignorance does not predict any systemic biases in voter beliefs.

Rational ignorance occurs when the cost of educating oneself on an issue exceeds the potential benefit that the knowledge would provide.

Marketers can take advantage of rational ignorance by increasing the complexity of a decision.

Additionally, rational ignorance is scrutinized for its broadening effect on the decisions that individuals make in different matters.

Rational irrationality and rational ignorance share some key similarities but are also different in a number of ways.

"Concentrated benefits and diffuse costs" is a label that some writers use to refer to the distributive consequences of rational ignorance.

There are two main objections to public choice theory and rational ignorance that do not apply to rational irrationality:

The theory, developed by James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and others, relies on rational ignorance.

Much of the empirical support for the idea of rational ignorance was drawn from studies of voter apathy, which reached particularly strong conclusions in the 1950s.

Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality."

That makes the individual see it as irrational to gain the knowledge, since (supposedly) there would be no benefit (the individual would see this as rational ignorance).

"Rational Ignorance and Voting Behavior" by Cesar Martinelli, International Journal of Game Theory.

Supporters also argue that sortition alleviates the problems of voter fatigue and rational ignorance, which is seen as a problem in both representative democracy and direct democracy.

Some suggest that financial illiteracy is an example of what economists call "rational ignorance"-inattention that is justified because the costs of paying attention outweigh the benefits.

The debate involves the "rational ignorance" theory, which is based on a crucial difference between typical voters and the experts: voters don't get paid to study foreign-policy speeches and health care proposals.

One of the basic claims that results from public choice theory is that good government policies in a democracy are an underprovided public good, because of the rational ignorance of the voters.

Related to the public choice concept of rational ignorance, Caplan proposes the concept of "rational irrationality" as an explanation for why the average voter holds views that are persistently and systematically contradictory to the consensus view of expert economists.

However, history shows that what politicians say does not always represent what they will do and if their actions will represent the important elements of their proposed agendas, as many citizens do not invest the time nor have the inclination to do so (see rational ignorance).

Due to rational ignorance, the vast majority of voters will be unaware of the effort; in fact, although voters may be aware of special-interest lobbying efforts, this may merely select for policies which are even harder to evaluate by the general public, rather than improving their overall efficiency.