Some significant preimage attacks have already been discovered, but they are not yet practical.

Functions that lack this property are vulnerable to preimage attacks.

Second preimage attacks against long messages are always much more efficient than brute force.

MD2-based certificates were used for a long time and were vulnerable to preimage attacks.

If a practical preimage attack is discovered, it would drastically affect many Internet protocols.

In contrast to a preimage attack, neither the hash value nor one of the inputs is specified.

Faster preimage attacks can be found by cryptanalysing certain hash functions, and are specific to that function.

This is called a preimage attack and may or may not be practical depending on L and the particular computing environment.

There are two meet-in-the-middle preimage attacks against SHA-2 with a reduced number of rounds.

A theoretical preimage attack also exists.

This fact can be used to construct a preimage attack against VSH of bits which has complexity rather than as expected.

To prevent preimage attacks, the cryptographic hash function used for a fingerprint should possess the property of second preimage resistance.

In 2008, MD2 has further improvements on a preimage attack with time complexity of 2 compression function evaluations and memory requirements of 2 message blocks.

In April 2009, a preimage attack against MD5 was published that breaks MD5's preimage resistance.

In cryptography, a preimage attack is a classification of attacks on cryptographic hash functions for finding a message that has a specific hash value.

In general, a collision attack is easier to mount than a preimage attack, as it is not restricted by any set value (any two values can be used to collide).

Constructing a password that works for a given account requires a preimage attack, as well as access to the hash of the original password, which may or may not be trivial.

The primary threat to the security of a fingerprint is a preimage attack, where an attacker constructs a key pair whose public key hashes to a fingerprint which matches the victim's fingerprint.

The 256 and 320-bit versions diminish only the chance of accidental collision, and don't have higher levels of security (against preimage attacks) as compared to, respectively, RIPEMD-128 and RIPEMD-160.

The paper presents a collision attack in 2 time, and first and second preimage attacks in 2 time (2 time refers to the approximate number of times the algorithm was calculated in the attack).

The official comments on ECOH included a proposal called ECOH2 that doubles the elliptic curve size in an effort to stop the Halcrow-Ferguson second preimage attack with a prediction of improved or similar performance.

The extent to which C is altered by the input depends entirely on the transformation function f. In hash applications, resistance to collision or preimage attacks depends on C, and its size, the "capacity" c, is typically twice the desired resistance level.

For each private key y and its corresponding z public key pair, the private key length must be selected so performing a preimage attack on the length of the input is not faster than performing a preimage attack on the length of the output.