mind-independent

There is no such thing as a mind-independent entity.

Furthermore, a mind-independent property does not have to be the value of some physical variable such as position or momentum.

Realism is the philosophical position species are real mind-independent entities, natural kinds.

Chaos science may be examining mindprints, rather than data which is mind-independent.

However, they remained in agreement that universals did indeed have a mind-independent existence.

Realists, in contrast, hold that perceptions or sense data are caused by mind-independent objects.

This position seemed incompatible with the view of atoms and molecules as external, mind-independent things.

They are not meant to give an account of matter as constitutive of external, mind-independent reality.

Realism in the philosophy of mathematics is the claim that mathematical entities such as number have a mind-independent existence.

Stevens has been understood as an idealist, denying the existence of a (mind-independent) external world, but that is not necessary.

Epistemologically, idealism manifests as a skepticism about the possibility of knowing any mind-independent thing.

This is not generally thought to be a problem because realists imagine that they can, in fact, specify a place and time for a 'mind-independent' object.

On Putnam's account, the idea that we refer with our sentences and statements to a mind-independent, nonlinguistic world is an illusion.

The metaphysical presumption or interpretation that no mind-independent reality exists or can be known is idealism.

How plausible is Blackburn's account of how the quasi-realist can earn the right to the idea that morals are mind-independent?

Information, understood in Dretske's sense, is something that exists as an objective and mind-independent feature of the natural world and can be quantified.

When they fail to describe this mind-independent moral reality, they are false-no matter what anyone believes, hopes, wishes, or feels.

There are suitably mind-independent and therefore objective moral facts that moral judgments are in the business of describing.

Put simply, critical realism highlights a mind-dependent aspect of the world that reaches to understand (and comes to an understanding of) the mind-independent world.

Nominalists hold that universals are not real mind-independent entities but either merely concepts (sometimes called "conceptualism") or merely names.

Disjunctivists claim this because they hold that in veridical perception, a subject's experience actually contains the external, mind-independent object of that perception.

The neopragmatist views mind-independent reality to causally influence people's minds but whatever way that influence may be on the individual mind is up to the individual.

Likewise, the mind-independent properties of quantum systems could consist of a tendency to respond to particular measurements with particular values with ascertainable probability.

The Master Argument refers to George Berkeley's argument that mind-independent objects do not exist because it is impossible to conceive of them.

Matter can be argued to be redundant, as in bundle theory, and mind-independent properties can in turn be reduced to subjective percepts.