intensionality

Intentionality should not be confused with intensionality, a related concept from logic and semantics.

It stands in contrast to the concept of intensionality, which is concerned with whether the internal definitions of objects are the same.

With some modifications to handle intensionality and quantification, this approach can be used to cover a wide variety of semantic phenomena.

A consciousness - intentionality - generating meanings - intensionality - is an example of a higher level reality functioning as a downward causal force.

(the problem of intensionality)

The intensionality is primarily accomplished by the absence of a built-in equality operator, since any two syntactically different terms might have slightly different Fregean senses.

His most famous book, it argues in favor of naturalizing epistemology, supports physicalism over phenomenalism and mind-body dualism, and supports extensionality over intensionality.

If it is true that reality is mind-independent, then reality might include objects that are unknown to consciousness and thus might include objects not the subject of intensionality.

In philosophical arguments about dualism versus monism, it is noted that thoughts have intensionality and physical objects do not (S.E. Palmer, 1999), but rather have extension in space.

Intension and intensionality (the state of having intension) should not be confused with intention and intentionality, which are pronounced the same and occasionally arise in the same philosophical context.

The modal-logical treatment of provability helped demonstrate the "intensionality" of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, meaning that the theorem's correctness depends on the precise formulation of the provability predicate.

Searle emphasizes that the word 'intentionality, (the part of the mind directed to/from/about objects and relations in the world independent of mind) should not be confused with the word 'intensionality' (the logical property of some sentences that do not pass the test of 'extensinalidade').

She proposes a way to integrate standard decision-theoretic axiomatizations into this foundation without loss of predictive power, by (1) rendering explicitly the intensionality of preference orderings using classical predicate logic; and (2) extending the Boolean connectives and quantificational notation of that logic to subsentential constituents.