birthday attack

The size of the hash-128 bit-is small enough to contemplate a birthday attack.

Birthday attacks are often discussed as a potential weakness of the Internet's domain name service system.

Digital signatures can be susceptible to a birthday attack.

This is slightly better than the birthday attack which is expected to take 2 compression function evaluations.

A second pre-image attack exists in the form of generalized birthday attack.

It requires a hash value at least twice as long as that required for preimage-resistance; otherwise collisions may be found by a birthday attack.

The goal is to show that any attack that can be found is at most as efficient as the birthday attack under certain assumptions.

A birthday attack is a type of cryptographic attack that exploits the mathematics behind the birthday problem in probability theory.

The second criterion, finding two different messages that produce the same message digest, known as a collision, requires on average only 2 evaluations using a birthday attack.

In contrast, file fingerprints need to be at least 64-bit long to guarantee virtual uniqueness in large file systems (see birthday attack).

Description of the attack: This is a Wagner's Generalized Birthday Attack.

The Meet-in-the-middle attack is a cryptographic attack which, like the birthday attack, makes use of a space-time tradeoff.

When a collision attack is discovered and is found to be faster than a birthday attack, a hash function is often denounced as "broken".

In light of the birthday attack, this means that for a given word width w, RadioGatún is designed to have no attack with complexity less than 2.

Much like symmetric-key ciphers are vulnerable to brute force attacks, every cryptographic hash function is inherently vulnerable to collisions using a birthday attack.

Besides solving the Summation Polynomial Problem, there exists another way how to find second pre-images and thus collisions, Wagner's generalized birthday attack.

Known working attacks are: Generalized Birthday Attack, which takes operations and inversion attacks which takes 2 operations for a standard parameter choice.

Pollard's rho algorithm for logarithms is an example for an algorithm using a birthday attack for the computation of discrete logarithms.

MD5CRK was a distributed project started in March 2004 with the aim of demonstrating that MD5 is practically insecure by finding a collision using a birthday attack.

The mathematics behind this problem led to a well-known cryptographic attack called the birthday attack, which uses this probabilistic model to reduce the complexity of cracking a hash function.

Mihir Bellare, Tadayoshi Kohno: Hash Function Balance and Its Impact on Birthday Attacks.

This is exploited by birthday attacks on cryptographic hash functions and is the reason why a small number of collisions in a hash table are, for all practical purposes, inevitable.

It describes various cryptographic attacks on the algorithms - including key-recovery attack, brute force key recovery, and birthday attack - and analyses the resistance of each algorithm to those attacks.

Due to the birthday paradox (see also birthday attack) there is a 50% chance a collision can be found in time of about 2 where n is the number of bits in the hash function's output.

Eli Biham and Adi Shamir (1991) applied the technique of differential cryptanalysis to N-Hash, and showed that collisions could be generated faster than by a birthday attack for N-Hash variants with even up to 12 rounds.