anti-realism

Anti-realism about matter or physical entities also has a long history.

Anti-realism is the theory of understanding which has been mentioned at various points in this chapter.

If there are some areas where anti-realism is comparatively easy to accept, well and good.

Thought and Reality (2006) was a further disquisition on anti-realism.

Anti-realism is the latest in a long series of terms for views opposed to realism.

Nothing is literal here, everything is said through an anti-realism of concept.

We have mentioned, but not adopted, two positions which show promise in this respect: externalism and anti-realism.

Both these positions are forms of anti-realism.

Instrumentalism avoids the debate between anti-realism and philosophical or scientific realism.

Ethical subjectivism is one form of moral anti-realism.

He links it to verificationism (the 'verification principle'), an earlier form of anti-realism.

In a contemporary sense, realism is contrasted with anti-realism, primarily in the philosophy of science.

"If he wasn't assigned in a college seminar on postwar anti-realism, he wasn't read."

It follows that Goodman accepts many forms of realism and anti-realism without apparently being troubled by the resulting contradictions.

For a brief discussion comparing such anti-realism to its opposite, realism, see (Okasha 2002, ch.

Brogaard has also offered well known philosophical accounts of moral permissibility, anti-realism, and knowledge-how.

To see this, we need to see how much anti-realism requires us to give up and how strong our realist intuitions are.

Blackburn's projectivism is a version of meta-ethical anti-realism.

Moral anti-realism, on the other hand, holds that moral statements either fail or do not even attempt to report objective moral facts.

This study covers Foucault and his contribution to the history of Continental Anti-Realism.

There are two main positions on the issue: realism and nominalism (sometimes simply called "anti-realism" about universals), along with conceptualism.

Anti-realism of this sort does not arise gratuitously, nor is it intended initially as a method of countering scepticism.

The principle of truth-value links is a concept in metaphysics discussed in debates between philosophical realism and anti-realism.

It has been taken as giving philosophical support to several schools of philosophy, most notably the Anti-realism of Michael Dummett.

Error theory, another form of moral anti-realism, holds that although ethical claims do express propositions, all such propositions are false.