Rabin cryptosystem

It is also useful for the computations in the Rabin cryptosystem.

Extensions of the Rabin cryptosystem achieve stronger notions of security.

This is the major disadvantage of the Rabin cryptosystem and one of the factors which have prevented it from finding widespread practical use.

Disambiguation introduces additional computational costs, and is what has prevented the Rabin cryptosystem from finding widespread practical use.

The Rabin cryptosystem is based on the assumption that this Rabin function is one-way.

The Rabin Signature Scheme is also closely related to the Rabin cryptosystem.

Rabin cryptosystem (including Rabin-Williams encryption)

The Rabin cryptosystem was the first asymmetric cryptosystem where recovering the entire plaintext from the ciphertext could be proven to be as hard as factoring.

It has been proven that decoding the Rabin cryptosystem is equivalent to the integer factorization problem, which is rather different than for RSA.

In 1979, Rabin invented the Rabin cryptosystem, the first asymmetric cryptosystem whose security was proved equivalent to the intractability of integer factorization.

The Rabin cryptosystem is an asymmetric cryptographic technique, whose security, like that of RSA, is related to the difficulty of factorization.

However the Rabin cryptosystem has the advantage that the problem on which it relies has been proved to be as hard as integer factorization, which is not currently known to be true of the RSA problem.

It can be shown that the latter problem is computationally equivalent to factoring 'N' (in the sense of polynomial-time reduction) The Rabin cryptosystem is based on the assumption that this Rabin one-way function is one-way.

The fact that finding a square root of a number modulo a large composite n is equivalent to factoring (which is widely believed be a hard problem) has been used for constructing cryptographic schemes such as the Rabin cryptosystem and the oblivious transfer.

The great advantage of the Rabin cryptosystem is that a random plaintext can be recovered entirely from the ciphertext only if the codebreaker is capable of efficiently factoring the public key n. Note that this is a very weak level of security.